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Responsive Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance Between Persuasion and 
Penalisation 
 
Abstract:  
 
 
This paper not only considers the regulatory challenges faced by regulators, but also the potential of 
responsive regulation and particularly meta regulation to address these challenges. It explores 
developments which have necessitated a change from the traditional form of regulation, that is, 
command and control regulation to more responsive hybrids of regulation. Even though traditional 
regulation has its advantages, its inability to address the demands of changing business environments 
has resulted in the adoption of more flexible forms of regulation such as risk based regulation and 
responsive regulation. Whilst the potential of responsive regulation is considered, the complexities and 
challenges faced by the regulator in identifying and assessing risk, solutions aimed at countering 
problems of risk regulation, along with the problems arising from different perceptions of risk will be 
addressed only briefly. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The challenges faced by regulators inter alia include the difficulties in addressing the problem of 
uncertainty generated by non prescriptive rules. Such uncertainty regarding the required level of 
minimum compliance could result in some companies going beyond what is actually required in 
complying with such  rules.1A consequence of the uncertainties regarding what is required by the law 
and the strong incentive to ensure compliance, which includes increased penalties, is evidenced by the 
difficulty in distinguishing between “beyond compliance” and “over compliance”.2 According to 
Gunningham and Johnstone, the encouragement given to organizations to go beyond strict legal 
requirements, constitutes an important benefit of more flexible and less prescriptive models of 
regulation.3 Gunningham also asserts that the unsatisfactory performance of both direct government 
regulation and market deregulation has compelled a review of present regulatory strategies, hence 
resulting in an experimentation with alternative mechanisms such as economic instruments, self-
regulation, co regulation and a range of information based strategies.4 In his opinion, the design of a 
“third phase” of regulation, one which still involves government intervention, but selectively and in 
addition to a range of market and non market solutions, will be required in order to address the 
inefficiencies of traditional regulation, on one hand, and the flaws inherent in deregulation on the other 
hand.5  
 
 
                                                 
1  See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of 
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research 
and Public Policy Series No 57 at page 24 
2  ibid at page 24; also see BH Kobayashi ‘Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the 
Antitrust Laws Against Corporations’ (2001) George Washington Law Review 69 (6) 715-744 
3  N Gunningham and R Johnstone Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions 1999 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press at page 35 
4  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 35 
5  ibid at page 10 
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Interactions between states and markets 
Legal regulation 
 
The occurrence of interactions between states and markets does not take place in a vacuum.6 Such 
interactions determine the position assumed by legal regulation.7 The characterisation of different 
types of law has occurred on the basis of reference to the their "location in space".8 Legal pluralism, 
which is generally perceived to be a prominent form in globalisation, refers to “geographical or 
metaphorical notions of space in its conception of law.”9 
 
A consideration of legal regulation as state-market interactions simply does not generate analytical 
questions which relate to the nature of these interactions, but also prescriptive questions, namely, the 
degree of state intervention and market ordering required for the facilitation of effective regulation.10 
 
Changes in state-market relationships are reflected through: Gradually blurred lines between states and 
markets, which is attributed to the privatization of states and the dominance of markets by powerful 
corporate actors.11 Further, in response to changing state-market relationships, modern forms of legal 
regulation have developed.12 
The privilege of the inclusion of state-economy interactions in considering legal regulation derives 
from the definition of legal regulation, which can be defined as the regulation of economic activities.13 
 
State Regulation or Self Regulation ?      
“Decentring regulation” is used to express the notion that governments should not and do not have a 
monopoly on regulation and that regulation is now being carried out by other actors namely: large 
organisations, collective associations, professions, technical committees etc without government's 
involvement or even formal approval.14 Decentring also refers to changes occurring within 
government and administration : the internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and 
implementation.15 Self-regulation fits into this analysis because it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as 
it is not state regulation.16 
 
The responsive approach (to regulation) proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite involves a process 
whereby regulators proceed with compliance based strategies and then resort to more punitive 
“deterrents” when the desired level of compliance is not achieved.17 In their opinion, this is a more 
preferable option to the positions supported either by those who believe that “gentle persuasion works 
in securing business compliance with the law”18 and those who only consider that corporations would 
only comply with the law where tough sanctions were applied. Greater regulatory challenges, in their 
                                                 
6  B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003)12 (4) 413 
7  ibid  
8 ibid at page 414 
9 ibid 
10 ibid at 416 
11  See B Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ Sage Publications (2003) 12 (4) 413 
12  ibid 
13  See S Picciotto ‘Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of Globalization’ in D Campbell and 
S Picciotto (eds) ‘New Directions in Regulatory Theory’, special issue of the Journal of Law and Society 
29(1) 1-11 
14 J Black,  'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post – 
Regulatory' World (2001) in M. Freeman (ed.) 103 
15 Ibid  p 104 
16 Ibid  p 113 
17  I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: 
Social Legal Studies at page page 101 
18  ibid at page 20 
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view, were to be found, not at the apex of the pyramid of regulatory strategies, nor at the base of the 
pyramid, but at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies.19 Such intermediate 
sections, thus, were in greatest need of regulatory innovation.  
With the responsive approach, it is assumed that regulation would always commence at the base of the 
pyramid. The Enforced Self-Regulation Model is a form of responsive regulation whereby negotiation 
occurs between the state and the individual firms to establish regulations that are particularized to each 
firm.20 In the Enforced Self-regulation Model, each firm is required to propose its own regulatory 
standards in order to  avoid harder (and  less  tailored) standards imposed by the state.21 This 
individual firm is “enforced” in two senses :22 
First the firm is required by the State to do the self-regulation. Second, the privately written rules can 
be publicly enforced. Governments are advised to resort to “command regulation with non-
discretionary punishment” only after having considered, firstly, the provision of solutions which are 
self regulatory to industries, and where the relevant goals were not achieved under this option, the 
subsequent adoption of a more rigorous approach of “command regulation with discretionary 
punishment” through enforced self regulation.23 As a result of the susceptibility of states to capture 
and corrupt related activities in business, it is of immense importance for third parties, non 
government organisations particularly, to be directly involved in the oversight of regulatory 
enforcement.24 As well as this function of acting as a safeguard against the capture of state regulators, 
non government organisations can also directly regulate businesses themselves through schemes 
which they oversee.25 Responsive regulation considers the role of non government organisations as 
regulators to be so fundamentally important, in the same way that businesses play a vital role as 
regulators – as well as regulatees.26 
 
Although the ‘pyramid of regulatory strategies’ is directed at individual regulated firms, a parallel 
approach is applied by Ayres and Braithwaite to entire industries.27 
 
Enforced self regulation was not only proposed as a means of striking a balance between the advocates 
of “gentle persuasion” works best and those who favor tougher measures, but also considered to be of 
greatest need at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies28. In striking this 
balance between compliance and enforcement measures, Ayres and Braithwaite contribute to resolving 
regulatory difficulties faced by regulators, of when best to apply either compliance or punitive 
measures, and in situations where the use of  excessive punitive deterrent measures could conceal 
harsh treatment of less significant regulatees. According to Baldwin and Black, Ayres and Braithwaite 
acknowledge the possible difficulties of moving down the regulatory pyramid since relationships 
between regulators and regulatees, which are foundations for less punitive strategies, could be 
influenced through the application of overly punitive sanctions.29 Furthermore, ‘voluntary’ compliance 
                                                 
19  ibid at page 101. A range of certified punitive strategies exist at the apex of the pyramid whilst experience of 
the successes and failures of the free market and  of self regulation (aimed at protecting consumers) can be 
found at the base of the pyramid, ibid 
20 ibid p 101 
21 ibid 
22I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) Oxford: 
Social Legal Studies at page 101 
23 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
24  See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 
34 No 5 at page 888 
25  ibid; also see Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation, chapter 3. 
26 ibid 
27 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 5 
28  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation at page 101 
29 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 
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at the base of the pyramid could be rendered extremely difficult as a result of constant threat of 
punitive measures at the top.30  
 
Further criticisms directed at the pyramid approach, in addition to the above mentioned criticism, can 
be classified into three groups, namely, “the policy” or “conceptual”, “the practical” and “the 
constitutional”.31 Legal problems which exist in applying a responsive approach may arise from the 
fact some legislatures may have stipulated deterrence procedures which may leave little scope for the 
enforcement agency in adopting such an approach.32 Furthermore, responsive regulation would be 
difficult to implement in corrupt societies since it encourages situations whereby discretion is given to 
bureaucrats who may exploit such discretion for purposes aimed at promoting their own interests.33 
 
The incentive structures which exist within a firm become very crucial in issues involving voluntary or 
involuntary compliance. Whilst it has been observed by some34 that good regulatory practice should 
focus on outcomes of regulatory objectives, rather than compliance with prescriptive rules, the concern 
relating to whether compliance is ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary appears to be of irrelevance as long as 
compliance is ultimately achieved. Nevertheless, compliance is vital , hence the need for direct 
monitoring by the State or government. 
Three fundamental elements exist in implementing responsive regulation.35 The first of these consists 
of disapproval which is systematic, fairly directed and explained in its entirety. The second element 
combines such disapproval with a respect for regulatees , whilst the third consists of increased 
intensification of regulatory response in situations where the regulator has tried considerably, but 
without success, to meet those standards which are required. 
 
Advantages of Traditional Regulation 
 
Although command and control regulation has been criticized for its rigidity, such rigidity having 
contributed to economic inefficiency, Latin suggests that this approach has advantages.36 Furthermore, 
these advantages extend beyond those advantages identified with more tailored and flexible 
instruments.37 
- ……”decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consistency and predictability of 
results, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny and participation, increased likelihood that 
regulations will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for manipulative behavior by 
agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures, reduced opportunities for obstructive 
behavior by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of social dislocation and “forum shopping” 
                                                 
30  ibid  
31  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 and for further criticisms, see ibid. 
32  ibid at page 9 
33  See J Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies’ (2006) World Development Volume 
34 No 5 at page 896 
34  See F Haines and D Gurney ‘ Regulatory Compliance: The Problems and Possibilities in Generic Models of 
Regulation’ in ’Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance’ R Johnstone and R Sarre (eds) (2004) Research 
and Public Policy Series No 57 at page 19; P May and R Burby ‘Making Sense Out of Regulatory 
Enforcement’ Law and Policy 20 (2) 157-182, J Black ‘Rules and Regulators’ Journal of Law and Society 26 
(2) 215-239 (1997) Oxford: Clarendon Press  
35 See R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 6 , and also J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Restorative Justice  (2002) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
36  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 42 
37 ibid; also see H Latin ‘Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
“Fine Tuning” Reforms’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review at page 1271 
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resulting from competitive disadvantages between geographical regions or between firms in regulated 
industries”.-38 
The ability to define the expected behavior of regulatees with immense clarity, constitutes the major 
strength of command and control regulation.39 Not only does this enable breaches of the legal standard 
and legal enforcement to be identified in a relatively straight forward manner, it defines limits of 
regulators’ operations which enables the firms to have a clearer understanding of their regulatory 
obligations.40 
 
Addressing the Deficiencies of Traditional Regulation 
“Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both in what 
triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”.41 Ayres and Braithwaite also 
propose that regulation be responsive to industry structure – since different structures will be 
conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation.42 According to Baldwin and Black43, in order 
to be “really responsive”, regulators are required to be responsive - not only to the level of compliance 
of the regulatee, but also to the frameworks within the firms – both operating and cognitive, to the 
environment which encompasses the regulatory regime, which is broader and institutional, to the 
different ways whereby regulatory tools and strategies operate, to the performance of the regime and 
ultimately, to changes which exist within each of the mentioned elements. Regulation, it is argued, is 
responsive when it knows its regulatees and its environments, when it is capable of coherently 
organizing different and new regulatory modes of reasoning, when it is sensitive to performance and 
when it recognizes what its changing challenges are.44 Baldwin and Black’s opinion of what is really 
responsive would have to take into consideration the growing impact of risk.45 
Gunningham advances the argument that the deployment of a range of regulatory actors to implement 
combinations of “policy instruments”, which are tailored to individual goals and circumstances, will 
generate more effective and efficient policy outcomes and that this approach should reduce the 
regulatory burden on government, thereby liberating scarce resources for apportionment to those areas 
which are in greatest need of government intervention.46 Greater focus is also placed on the ability of 
second and third parties - be it business, commercial or non commercial third parties- to act as quasi 
regulators who would complement or act as substitutes for government regulation in particular 
situations.47 Proposals are advanced whereby a set of principles and policy prescriptions can be 
designed to achieve a “regulatory mix”.48 
 
Self regulation and Co regulation 
The exercise of control by a group of firms or individuals, over its membership and their behaviour 
can be considered as self-regulation.49 Variables of self regulation consist of the governmental nature 
                                                 
38  ibid 
39 N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 42 
40  ibid at page 41 
41  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation   p  4 
 
 
42   ibid 
43  R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at pages 3 and 4 
44  ibid 
45 See M Ojo ‘The Growing Importance of Risk in Regulation’ Munich Personal Archive (2009) < 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13723/> 
46  N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : 
Clarendon Press at page 15 
47 ibid 
48 See ibid at page 19 
49  See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
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of self-regulation, the level of involvement of self regulators and the extent of the binding legal force 
which is connected to self-regulatory rules.50 Claims in favour of self regulation or the incorporation of 
components of self regulation into governmental regulation are based on arguments related to 
expertise and efficiency.51 
“Coregulation, as distinct from enforced self-regulation, is usually taken to mean industry-association 
self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government.”52 It is distinguished from 
enforced self regulation in that with enforced self regulation, negotiations which are aimed at 
establishing regulations that are tailor made to each firm, take place between the state and individual 
firms.53 
 
 
Meta Regulation 
Why Meta Regulatory Strategies Could Be the Most Responsive Forms of Regulation  
 
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk54 and the control of risks can be considered to be the 
main concern of regulation.55 “The regulatory state is becoming a risk management state”56. Ulrich 
Beck argues that whilst the standard way of risk regulation in modern societies was well suited for 
such societies, it is not responsive enough to our “post modern” societies.57 Risk is, as a result, 
inefficiently controlled at too high a cost.58 Recent years have witnessed growing acceptance of the 
fact that the efficiency of regulation will be enhanced where a collaboration with private control 
systems exists.59 By utilising activities which relate to private internal control systems for purposes 
                                                                                                                                                        
University Press at page 125 
50  ibid at pages 125 and 126 
51  ibid at page 126; In relation to expertise, it is usually advanced that self-regulatory bodies possess greater 
expertise than is the case with independent regulation. Efficiency is also a ground put forward by proponents 
of self regulation in that self regulation emphasizes the ability of self regulation to generate controls in an 
efficient manner – since there is greater accessibility to those being controlled. Furthermore, self regulators 
are able to acquire information at lower costs, incur low monitoring and enforcement costs and can easily 
adapt their regimes to changing industrial conditions; ibid at page 127. 
52  P Grabosky and J Braithwaite,. Of Manners Gentle; Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business 
Regulatory Agencies, (1986) Oxford University Press, Melbourne at page 83 
53  See also I Ayres  and  J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1995) 
Oxford: Social Legal Studies at page 101 and R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at pages 125-127 
54  U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications ; also see C Hood, H 
Rothstein and R Baldwin The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk (2001) Oxford University Press  
55  R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press at page 138 
56  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
23 and also see B Fischoff, SR Watson and C Hope ‘ Defining Risk’ Policy Sciences 17 (1984) 
57 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications and also M Lassagne 
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
Management’ see< http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf> (last visited 17th 
March 2009) According to Ulrich Beck and other sociologists’ considerations of the “risk society”, nature 
does not play a role in generating risks in the sense that risks are no longer the consequence of external or 
uncontrollable factors such as “force majeure” but are generated through man made decisions. Cultural 
theorists however, argue that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural preferences. See R Baldwin and M 
Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at page 141. 
Also see M Douglas Risk and Blame (1992) London 
58  It can be observed from daily occurrence that more attention should be devoted to recent evolution toward 
risk based regulation, examples of which can be found in recent European and partly Western-rule setting as 
illustrated by the Basel II agreement on the regulation of risks in banking and the European Commission 
White Paper on how to regulate risk in the chemical industry. For more information on this, see M Lassagne 
and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and Strategic 
Management’ <http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf >(last visited 17th March 
2009) 
59  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
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which are of public regulatory nature, regulators are not only able to relieve themselves of the 
cumbersome work which derives from rule making, but are also able to concentrate on the oversight of 
the functioning and design of local systems.60 ‘Enforced self regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’ 
and ‘meta regulation’ are various forms which a responsive model may assume and  such a model 
assigns a central role to internal control systems.61 Basel II bank regulation reforms constitute an 
example of meta regulation. 
 
 Meta regulation is referred to as the regulation of self regulation62 whilst meta risk management 
implies the risk management of risk management. Traditionally risk management, to a large extent, 
has focused on complying with current rules.63 It has great potential especially in situations where 
risks are volatile and where the regulator is not in a position to comprehend such risks.64 However 
maximum realisation of such potential can only occur only where such risks are within the control of 
an enterprise where the regulator holds an influential position.65 
As mentioned previously, over the years, there has been a trend towards greater regulation of business 
management processes and strategies of regulated firms through regulatory tools which address the 
role of senior managements of firms and directly regulate individuals within firms.66 According to 
Fiona Haynes, meta regulation “with its collaborative approach to rule generation”, could 
controversially be considered to be the approach with greatest evolvement when considered in relation 
to other approaches such as co-regulation, enforced self regulation and process or management-based 
regulation.67 Meta regulation is a method which is capable of managing “self regulatory capacity” 
within those sites being regulated whilst exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals 
and levels of risk reduction to be achieved in regulation.68 Processes and procedures for risk 
management are developed, not only by key stake holders, but also by personnel within these 
organisations.69 This takes place whilst ensuring that “pro-compliance motivational postures” are 
generated within the site being regulated such that the goal of the regulator, that is, risk reduction, is 
achieved.70 The success of the implementation of meta regulation is based on the regulator and 
regulated organisation’s understanding of risk priorities in the same manner.71 Meta regulation is 
advantageous particularly where there are complex causes of harm, which also require constant 
monitoring.72 
 
However, problems exist in establishing the cause of regulatory responsibility – be it individual or 
organisational. Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA (Financial Services Authority) 
highlighted how the more holistic focus which meta regulation has on systemic failures on the part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
21. 
60  ibid 
61  ibid; Also see E Rosa, ‘Meta Theoretical Foundations For Post Normal Risk’ Journal of Risk Research 1 
(1998) 
62  See the penultimate chapter of Christine Parker’s book, C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- 
Regulation and Democracy. 2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
63  M Lassagne and B Munier, ‘The Move Towards Risk-Based Regulation and Its Impact on Operational and 
Strategic Management’ see http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca/activites/050930/papers/munier.pdf (last visited 
17th March 2009) 
64  J Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Governance Paper to Risk Regulation, Accountability 
and Development Conference, University of Manchester, 26-27 June 2003 at page 1 
65 ibid 
66 J Gray and  J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation  (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2006 at page 2 
67  F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 3 
68  ibid at page 1 
69  ibid at page 3; Also see C Parker The Open Corporation: Effective Self- Regulation and Democracy. 2002 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
70  ibid 
71 F Haines,‘Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of 
Disaster’, Law and Social Inquiry ( 2009) 39 (forthcoming) at page 17 
72  ibid at page 1 
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firms, rather than their specific acts or omissions, is starting to influence the ways of approaching 
issues of causation in the framework of regulatory responsibility. 
 
The increasing popularity of internal control systems has been an express feature of risk 
management.73 Primary or real risks74 are translated by internal control systems into systems risks such 
as early warning mechanisms and compliance violation alerts.75 As a result, many risks are capable of 
being and are being “operationalised” as organisational processes of control.76 Such transformation is a 
pre requisite for the feasibility of risk based regulation – which will be discussed in the final section of 
this article.77 
 
Good Regulatory Policy and Successful Regulatory Design 
 
Enforced Self Regulation envisions that in particular situations, it will be more efficacious for the 
regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive and judicial regulatory functions.78 
Ayres and Braithwaite however stress that whatever particular regulatory functions should be “sub 
contracted” to the regulated firms would be dependent on the industry’s structure and historical 
performance and that delegation of legislative functions need not imply delegation of executive 
functions. 
The issue of monitoring is crucial in the model of Enforced Self-Regulation. In  achieving the right 
mix of regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of regulatory resources would be important.79 Direct 
government monitoring would still be necessary for firms too small too afford their own compliance 
groups.80 State involvement would not stop at monitoring as violations of the privately written and 
publicly ratified rules would be punishable by law .81 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite demonstrate that Enforced Self-Regulation might produce simple specific rules 
that would make possible both more efficient, comparable accounting and easier conviction of 
violators.82 
 
Good regulatory policy could therefore be said  to constitute  an acceptance  of  the inevitability of 
some  sort  of symbiosis between  state regulation and self  regulation.83  According to Rose – 
Ackerman (1988)84, good regulatory policy should be a combination of  self – regulation and  state 
regulation. Issue relates to what  proportion of  self-regulation or state regulation should make up a 
good regulatory policy. This is of vital importance as proper delegation of a certain percentage of 
responsibilities to the state and individual institutions would reduce many of the disadvantages of the 
Enforced Self Regulation Model. 
 
                                                 
73  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
24 
74  Primary risks, for example financial loss are distinguished from secondary risk (reputational  risk) see ibid at 
page 32 
75 ibid at page 24 
76  ibid 
77  ibid 
78  Ayres  and  Braithwaite, Responsive  Regulation   p 103 
79I Ayres and  J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate  ( New York: 
Oxford Union Press 1992) 129 
80 Ibid  p 106 
81 ibid 
82C Hadjiemmanuil, 'Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: A Trend Towards Megaregulators, United 
Kingdom: Full Consolidation as a Response to the Inefficiencies of Fragmentation'   p  109 
83 I Ayres and  J Braithwaite,  Responsive  Regulation :  Transcending  the  Deregulation  Debate   (Oxford 
Union Press 1992)  3 
84 Ibid  at  p 3 
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Ayres and Braithwaite also argue85 that good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free 
market and government regulation nor deciding what the law should prescribe. They suggest that an 
understanding of private regulation, its interdependence with state regulation is required to achieve the 
mix of private and public regulation. 
 
Achieving the right mix of private and public regulation is one of the greatest challenges in designing 
a good regulatory policy. Ayres and Braithwaite86 contend that there is no such thing as an optimal 
regulatory strategy and that there are just different strategies that have a mix of strengths and 
weaknesses. They go on to say that the appropriateness of a particular strategy depends on the legal, 
constitutional and cultural context and history of its invocation. 
 
Gunningham and Sinclair87 propose two vital components of a successful regulatory design namely, 
regulatory design principles88 and instrument mixes.89 Regulatory processes are classified into four 
namely:90 Identification of the desired policy goal(s) and tradeoffs necessary to achieve it, 
identification of the unique characteristics of problem being addressed, identification of the range of 
potential regulatory participants and policy instruments and identification of opportunities for 
consultation and public participation. 
 
Regulatory principles are classified into five namely:91Prefer policy mixes incorporating a broader 
range of instruments and institutions, prefer less interventionist measures which include the principle 
of low interventionism, ascending a dynamic instrument pyramid to the level required to achieve 
policy goals – including building in regulatory responsiveness, empowering participants which are 
best placed to act as quasi regulators – including the application of the principle of empowerment and 
maximizing opportunities for win-win outcomes – including the consideration of whether firms will 
voluntarily go beyond compliance. Instrument mixes92 are broadly classified into those which involve 
inherently complementary activities93, inherently counter productive instrument combinations, 
sequencing instrument combinations94, combinations where outcome will be context specific and multi 
instrument mixes. 
 
Responsive regulation v risk based regulation 
 
Theoretically, regulatory regimes can become more responsive to the self-organisation of regulatees 
regardless of whether such regulates are banks or local government service providers.95 Risk based 
regulation, in Power’s view, is considered to be a blue print for the “risk management state”.96 
 
In comparison to responsive regulation, risk based regulation is relatively new.97 A risk based 
approach to regulation, particularly enforcement, was recommended by the Hampton Review in March 
                                                 
85 Ibid at  p 3 
86 Ibid at  p 101 
87See concluding chapter ‘Designing Environmental Policy’ by N Cunningham and D Sinclair in N Gunningham 
and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) Oxford : Clarendon Press 
88 ibid at pages 387-419 
89 ibid at pages 422- 448 
90 see ibid at pages 378-385 
91 supra note 88 
92 supra note 89 
93 These include voluntarism and command and control regulation, self-regulation and command and control, 
command and control regulation (or self regulation) and supply side incentives, command and control (or self 
regulation) and broad based economic instruments (which target different aspects of a common problem), 
liability rules and command and control (or self regulation) 
94 These include self regulation and sequential command and control, self regulation and sequential broad based 
economic instruments 
95 M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 21 
96 ibid 
97 See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell, ‘ A Theory of Risk Colonisation’ (2006) 35 (1) Economy and 
Society at page 91 
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2005.98  In the aftermath of the Hampton Review, ‘risk based’ regulation has been implemented 
primarily through inspection and enforcement procedures which are derived through an examination 
of risks posed by a regulated person or firm to a regulatory agency’s objectives.99 
. 
 
Risk based regulation has been adopted by several regulatory agencies as a means of organising 
resource allocation, managing limited resources and concentrating those resources where they are 
needed most - for example, in cases involving banks with weak internal controls.100 Such an approach 
is strategic and goal oriented at the same time.101 The link between risk and strategy is vital in 
advertising new regulatory approaches and risk management, and would also improve communication 
between the regulator and the regulated.102 
 
Responsive regulation is distinguished from risk based regulation since the latter focuses on analysis 
and targeting rather than a “process of responsive escalation”103. Whilst the framework of risk based 
approaches not only enables regulators to relate enforcement-related activities to the achievement of 
objectives, but also allows for the targeting of resources  in such a way which prioritises the highest 
risks, the main controversial issue surrounding risk based regulation relates to inspection. 
 
Furthermore, risk based regulation is an embodiment of the idea that regulatory failures are possible – 
in contrast with the concept of zero tolerance.104 Whilst some events can be classified as being of 
“zero-tolerance” nature, such an event as that of the fall of Equitable Life, which could be considered 
as ‘tolerable’ from the perspective of a systemic financial risk, in fact, generated life changing 
catastrophic consequences for many.105 
 
Other problems which relate to risk based regulation derive from the fact that “drivers of action” are 
short term random and irrational considerations, focus is not necessarily given to the most important 
risks, there is likelihood that risk based systems will tend to neglect lower levels of risk, which may 
aggregate to risks which are of immense and dangerous proportions.106  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The focus on internal controls and increasingly greater focus on risk management can be attributed to 
an increasingly volatile financial environment and the emergence of complex financial products (for 
example, derivatives). Whilst such factors necessitate the need for risk management, several 
consequences emanate from an excessive operation of risk management, namely107: Reliance on 
internal controls may increase risk if it leads to an undermining of the knowledge of risk in other 
areas; despite the benefits of risk management, concerns are generated due to the fact that secondary 
                                                 
98 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 12 
99  ibid 
100  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
21 
101  ibid 
102  ibid 
103 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at page 12 
104 See M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 22 
105  ibid 
106 R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
15/2007 at pages 13-14 
107  see  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 50- 58; “Soft management systems” which are able to address uncertainties need to be designed and a 
balance should be struck between the role of calculative methods and other softer forms such as images and 
normative. 
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risk management has become an accepted “organisational common sense”108- reflecting the society’s 
loss in faith in its professions and public organisations.109 According to Baldwin and Cave, the first 
regulatory challenge faced by regulators consists in the identification of risks that need to be reduced – 
not only on the basis of priority, but also in a way which would be approved by the public.110 
Secondly, regulators are confronted with the challenge of managing and regulating risks in a way 
which is both effective and acceptable.111 Furthermore, the design of institutions and techniques for 
managing risk, the choice of the appropriate regulatory technique, issues relating to whether risk 
management or regulation should be “blame oriented” and the contentious topic of reliance by risk 
managers on qualitative risk evaluations in contrast to more quantitative methods of assessments 
constitute additional challenges.112 
 
In spite of the above mentioned consequences and challenges, the ability of responsive regulation to 
address with greater efficiency, a complex113 factor such as risk, its flexibility and responsiveness to 
regulatees and its environment among other advantages, make it a more desirable regulatory tool than 
traditional regulation or risk based regulation. Whilst direct monitoring by the State would be required, 
the involvement of third parties such as non government organisations would also be crucial to 
ensuring that a situation, whereby the State could be captured, is avoided. Furthermore the possibilities 
available in achieving the right “regulatory mix” make it a promising regulatory tool. Even though the 
contested nature of risk contributes to the difficulty of relying on risk as a regulatory tool, its presence 
and ever growing significance cannot be ignored – hence the need for a form of regulation which is 
able to manage risk more effectively  and which would best suit an evolving regulatory environment. 
                                                 
108  See also D Marquand, The Decline of the Public Cambridge: Polity Press 2004 
109 The close association between organizational governance and risk management exacerbates this position. 
Furthermore, Power argues that to move beyond such “risk management driven privatization of the public 
sphere”, a new idea of risk which incorporates types of leadership at state, regulatory and corporate levels, 
and which is able to develop a language of risk, understood by the public and which expressly allows for the 
possibility of failure without this being understood as a way of “passing the buck”, will be required, see M 
Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 57 
and 58 
110  R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press at pages 142 and 143 
111  ibid at 143 
112 ibid at 144 
113 According to Baldwin and Cave, risk regulators encounter problems with the search for legitimation as a 
result of differences between the lay and experts’ perceptions of risk. For additional information on what 
could be done to improve the effect of legitimating arguments and solutions advanced to counter problems of 
risk regulation, see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(1999) Oxford University Press at pages 145 –149. For problems with defining and assessing risk, see page 
138 ibid 
